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n ie Gillen, Ben Smith, and David Walker

GTimothy Gordon

e >graphies of Globalization:
is . Josure Interviews Neil Smith

At Long Last the Rain

Neil Smith is among the most prolific and visible
critical geographers. He has written on a widevaricty of topics such as gentrification, international capitalist development, the continuing
importance of class, and the role of academics in
public life· for which his texts arc considered
foundational , including American Empire:
Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (2003), The Neiv Urban Frontier:
Gentrification and the Revanchist City ( 1996),
and Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and
the Production of Space (1991). Smith received a
Ph.D. in Geography from John Hopkins in 1982
and currently hold the position of distinguished
profc or at the City Univer ity of New York
Graduate Center, where he teaches in the Anthropology Department and directs the Center for
Place, Cu lture and Politic .
Thi interview with Neil Smith was conducted in late January 2003, by three University
of Kentucky Geography graduate studentsJamie Gillen, Ben Smith and David Walker. Support for a then-po ible invasion of Iraq was falling even among the American populace and Neil
Smith' latest book, American Empire was about
to be relca ed. In the interview, the topics covered included many of those central to Neil
Smith's corpus: the a sertion that foci traditionally a ociated with both Marxism- such a class
and production- and the di cipline of geography uch a pace and scale- mu t not be written out of discussion of globalization· the
changing role of the urban scale in terms of glo-

At long last the rain over T'ai-chung City.
Would the grey greyness never end?
Would what white fog does to us at dusk
When we come home from tasking the fields,
Alleys and arcane lanes of Pachinko parlors and sweetshops,
Filled with the smoky iron of lotus and coarse oolong tea,
Summoned afar to suburbs like spirits from abroad,
Wrapped in iceblue slickers, moist with the first wet
winter frost,
Unlocking our blue doors, enflesh us men and women,
Clearing the City of selling, buying, and bought?
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bal uneven development; the increasingly wide-spread phenomenon of
gentrification; and the need for critical academics to be internationally
active inside, across, and outside of academic disciplines.
dC: Since this is a theme issue on globalization, let's tart with thi
question: does the current climate of globalization reprc cnt a paradigm
shift in the nature of capital or is it merely an expansion of a much larger
process?

NS: The classic answer is both. But what docs that mean? Globalization
is not new. Globalization is built into the project of capital from the
start, so it is built into capitalism as a mode of production. I laving aid
that, that's not enough because clearly things have changed since the
1970s. There has been a real shift, and the important point is to figure
out what the basis of that shift is, how significant it is. So while globalization is not a paradigm shift that takes us out of capitalism, it certainly
has changed the way that capital works.
I think for me what makes sense is to think of globalization in term
of production . A very powerful ideological notion is that finance capital
is leading this globalization, and that's not true. Finance capital was
already globalized, if not by the First World War which JP Morgan
was funding in Europe before the US was involved then certainly by
the Breton Woods agreement and by the JMF and by all those institutions. It is not commercial trade that is globalizing either, because that
was already in place. Marx knew this. Adam Smith talked about the
world market. And I don ' t accept the argument that globalization is led
by a culture of global ization either, because l think that again, that's
been a long process and there is no real break in the 1970s or 80s that
leads to that.
The truth of what is going on is the globa lization of the production
process itself. It seems to me that instead of in the I 970 's when the
'
model was that production occurred within a national economy- which
certainly imported parts and exported goods and so on- now the model
is much more that there is literal global production. Production places
are all globally connected: parts come from multiple different places,
with construction taking place somewhere else, usually close to the market. By 1991 , 60% of trade was intra-company, and I' m sure the number
has gone way up since then. Companies were sending bits and pieces of
things to themselves in other countries and that's the best sign that the
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globalization of production has taken place. It is happening in some
industries more than others. It's highly uneven.
But that's a shift, and that's brought about a shift in financing. For
example, any place where a company is, it wants a stock market where it
can noat its stock . It's part of the advertising of the brand to have its
stock bought by people who want to make an investment locally. Say
Ford i producing a car in Kuala Lumpur from parts made in sixteen different countrie . lt till want a local stock market presence, to be able to
have its stock out there, ju t to create a base for consumption. Additionally, you also need to have the currency exchanges organized when
you've got parts coming from sixteen countries, and you need to be able
to organize the tran lation between Thai bahts and dollars and euros and
dinar . So that's created a sort of further globalization of the financial
area, but l think the recent globalization of production beats the globalization of finance.
So going back to the original question, the short answer is that on
the one hand , ye , capitali mis a global project and always has been.
Globalization i not new in that re pect. On the other hand there are tremendou hi ft since the economic restructurings of the 1970s and 80s
that really make capitali m quite different than it was before.
dC: an you draw on omc concrete example of how the current spatialization of capital adver cly affects the working poor across the globe
as well a allow for po ibilitics of resistance, which is the other part of
that equation?

N : Right. There arc many different examp les. One of the things that I
work on i gcntri fication, and the extraordinary ex pan ion of gentrification in the late 1990' ha led to increased impoverization of many people in central cities in the US, and al o in Europe, and actually outside
the centers of what we used to call "advanced capitalism." That is one
example. The level of homeles ness in New York City is probably
greater than it wa in the 1980 . All of the homeless organizations will
tell you that there arc ma sivc increases in the number of hom~l~ss people. The latest figures l heard were something like 30 000 families and
8,000 individual ccking helter on any given night. If you assume that
each family has at lea t two people let' a umc an average of three
people per family , plu 8,000, that' at lea t 98 000 people. In the 1980s
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you had a maximum of 100,000 people, and we are back to that level
and likely more.
So in the United States itself, for al 1of the hype about the market
and the stock market, the opposite end of prosperity is what is happening. Of course, there are the famous figures about the ratio of CEO's
earnings to the worker's earnings- a gap that has exploded ju t in the
last twenty years. CEO's are being compcn atcd at levels of hundreds of
millions of dollars. Wage rates have been kept down dramatically.
But it's more than that that ' the local, the U picture. A few
months ago, the Bush government introduced extraordinary levels of
farm subsidies. On the one hand it helped a particular class of people in
the United States- a class usually put over in the media as small farmers, but who are actually corporations mostly, 95% of them. These
"farmers" benefit disproportionately from these subsidies which keep
revenues high; the adverse effect of that in the re t of the world i that
market prices are kept low in ways that make it very difficult for people
to compete. The farm subsidy in itself is an extraordinary act of global
impoverization of farmers and farm workers. It is utter hypocri y. The
IMF tells everybody else to lower their subsidies and the US is building
subsidies up to support their own capitalists.
This is national self-interest that disgui ses it clfas globa l good.
You've got the US government supporting nco-liberal policies pretending that this is the global universal good, but of course at the same time
they are subsidizing farming corporations and putting 30% tariffs on
steel and screwing the rest of the world. 1 1f owcvcr, this phenomenon of
narrow interests masquerading as global interest is not just an American
thing - the European ruling classes are every bit as implicit in this, as
are the Japanese ruling classes. People in I larl em that arc li ving in
America are not going to benefit from these things while the British rul ing class is going to benefit. That's the importance of a class argument
across national boundaries.
dC: And as for the question about resistance, that cap ital always has to
spatialize, that it must 'touch down'. ..

spot, there is a parliament. I' m actually very heartened by the anti-global ization movement. I think this is one of the major forms of resistance
we have. In the West we tend to be focused on what happened in say
Seattle, what happened in Quebec, in Genoa- and that's not unreasonable but those kinds of anti-globalization events are also taking place
el cwhere, whether it's in Thailand and India, or the workers strikes in
China, which arc omewhat different.
Actually, the level of worker opposition in China is quite extraordinary. Tens of thousand of people are striking from factories. The interesting thing is why in the US new media which in a different context
you would expect to be anti-Chine c, to ay the Chinese government is
failing, to say hina mu t be a rotten Communist society- why none of
this new of all these worker revolting is coming through. Why is CNN
basically in collaboration with the Chinese government in preventing
new from coming out? The argument of cour e i that what the Chinese
worker arc doing is exactly what the rest of the world should be doing,
and the la t thing CNN want to do is advertise that to workers in the
United State or Europe or in Australia.
But returning to the que tion, I' m more optimistic than I was in the
1990 , especially after October 7th which is the crucial date- and it's
not cptcmbcr 11th bccau e it' the date that the United States started
bombing Afghani tan, which , when looked at from omc angles, was an
act of desperation. A hegemonic power doesn't have to bomb anybody.
A hegemonic power rule and Gramsci was great on this - by powerful, often largely un pokcn consent. The United States has lost the ability to rule in that con en ual way and the final result is military
bombing. People arc coming around to the fact that there is going to be a
lot of bloodshed in the realization of thi experience. So I think late
200 I i going to be een a ignaling the downfall of the third moment
of US globalization . Quite where it goe from there I don 't know and I
may be stupidly optimi tic but I' m optimistic. If we were able to stop
the US government from spearheading an attack on Iraq that would be a
victory. And it's happening! Even the third week of January 2003 with
Bush say ing we are go ing in ... thcy are really boxed in and their options
arc narrowing dramatically. The opposition is working.

NS: That's the great thing. This is the delicious part of it. Precisely
because capital has to touch down it becomes vulnerable; it becomes
vulnerable in economic terms but also in political terms. There is a
place, there is a building, there is a group of buildings, there is a meeting

dC: Part of your book, American Empire (2003), i about moments
failed moments actually, where American foreign policy has been used
lo try and create thi global climate under the auspice of an American
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Empire. We were wondering if you could talk a little bit about these
imperial ambitions and perhaps relate your position to those other
authors whose book has "empire" in its title Hardt and Negri. What do
you believe to be the same and different in your respective uses of the
term "empire."
NS: One of the central arguments in Ilardt and Negri 's book is that there
is no outside anymore, that the empire has now taken over. And l think
that on historical grounds they are completely wrong. They arc right that
there is no outside anymore, but this didn'tjust happen in the last twenty
years with so-called globalization. This happened at the turn of the 19th
into the 20th century. That's what all the language at the beginning of
the 20th century was about in terms of the end of frontier. People with
politics as diverse as Lenin, Harold Mackinder, Isaiah Bowman the
geographer who is the central fi gure in my book and Cecil Rhode , a
good old British imperia list, all understood that there was no outside
anymore in geographical terms. So, Hardt and Negri get the history
wrong.
They also get the geography wrong, because their argument is very
much one that argues for a deterritorialization of empi re. They use a language of ' non-place' spaces or the ' non-place' of empi re. Jn fact, the
whole argument about ' non-place' urban rea lms came from Melvin
Webber in 1964, 2 and it was a very powerful argument. But it was shot
down then, not by Marxists or radi cals so much as by geographers of the
period.
I don 't buy that part of their argument. Power is always located
somewhere. The question of empire is not one of how power has
become deterritorialized; the question concerns the rc-tcrritorializati on
of the power. Especially since September 200 I, you have to say that
there has been an extraordinary re-territorialization of power. But I don' t
think it's just September 11th that did thi s because we were making critiques of the Hardt and Negri book on these grounds since it came out.
But after September 2001, you look at what the Un ited States has done
'
the extraordinary power that has been gathered inside the United States
by the U.S. government, both over its own citizens and over the rest of
the world, and there is no way you can't see how power is thoroughly
being re-territorialized. The level of U.S. global bl ackmail , which none
of us have ever seen- whether it is issuing demands to the UN or
whether it is bribing other nations to join a coaliti on to bomb Iraq .
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that's a very place-based power. You never let go of the connection
between the geography of power and the social content of the power,
whether its class questions or race questions. That would be my critique.
The broader question of empire is really interesting because why
did the issue of empire di appear? Empire was a bad word for most of
the 20th century. The argument my book tries to make is that empire disappeared precisely becau c it told too much of the truth. Empire was the
right word for what the United States was trying to do; empire was what
was happening in the first moment of US global ambition in the period
from 1898 to 1920. Empire was what the United States was about when
Franklin Roo evelt talked about new world order, empire is exactly
what the United tale , the ruling class, a particular faction of the ruling
class actually, is about right now. The interesting question is how did
empire get lost?
I think the language of empire and how it got lost is very political. It
connect to geography a inherently political. So the shift from talking
about American empire in the early 20th century, as Brooks Adams
( 1902) and many others unabashedly did, to talking about an "American
Century" in 1941 i a shift not just from a spatial language to a historical
language, but actually it's a shift from a highly politicized target- an
empire to an historica l language that is utterly depoliticized. How do
you fight a century? And I think that's part of the crucial point. For us in
geography, part of the question i if this dcspatialization was partly a
dcpoliticization or at lea ta hi ft of the political grounds or a hiding of
the target of our politics globally, how do we make the target more visible again? Part of that is rcspatialization. And in a weird way, the right
wing of today, of 2003, i doing us a favor by talking about American
empire. There is an hone ty to American empire that the right agrees
with and the left needs to take up.
dC: Do you have an idea of what a good example of a globalized city is
in this era when American Empire is reasserting itself?
NS: Bangkok is up there. Mexico City. These arc extraordinary global
cities. I guess if you believe that globa lization i about globalization of
finance, then it make cnsc to think of the globa l city a a place where
financi al control and a broader level of command control operates.
That's the argument that bring you New York Tokyo, London as global
cities. But actually, if you think global ization i not the globalization of
disclosure 13
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finance, and that the issues are not just the issues of top-down control,
and you think that issues are actually about the globalization of production, as well as daily life and the connections that people have with the
rest of the world, then your vision of what a globa l city is changes dramatically. It is not that New York, London, and Tokyo arc not global cities- because they are globalized centers of production but it also
means that you must think seriously about Baghdad oh, that was a
slip--Bangkok, Bombay, Sao Paulo, Mexico ity, hanghai. If we arc
thinking about what cities arc going to look like in twenty year , the c
are the cities that arc laying out the models. New York is becoming
more like Shanghai, rather than the other way around. New York i
becoming more like Mexico City, rather than the other way around.
There is an American sense in which we can sec that. We need to hi ft
the whole argument about global cities. It is not that the financial activities in the New Yorks, Londons, and Tokyos arc not important. Giuliani
stood on the stage when he was elected and, it was almost Nixon-csquc,
he put his hands up and said, " I am the king of the world!" because he
was the mayor of New York. But here, once again, more attention needs
to be paid to production.
dC: Can you expand more on gentrification and its links to nco-libcralism and globalization?
NS: When I started looking at it in the 1970s, gentrification was an isolated anomaly. It shouldn 't have been happening and that is what
excited me about the process. I was only an undergraduate, but I had
read some urban stuff. Everyth ing I read said this shou ld not be happening. But what has happened since then is that gentrification has gone
from being anomalous to a marginal process to becoming a genera lized
global strategy. Gentrification has become part of the process of the
competition between cities. It becomes the housing policy. Even under
Koch [in New York City] it was the housing policy; they were done with
public housing. In the 1980s, we thought it was a North America,
Europe, Oceania thing. Now we see gentrification as major urban strategy not only in Mexico City, but also Sao Paolo, Seoul , Tokyo. ll is very
early days for something like gentrification in these places, but it is
jumping in a way beyond what it was like in the 1970s in London. It is
already corporately controlled and funded and the culture of the kind of
place they create is already go ing to have that sort of global patina. As
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opposed to the early gentrification projects which were relatively funky,
and as much as we reeled against them and for all the right reasons in
terms of class and race in particular and who got displaced, there was
that funky side. And now it is just utterly corporate. I now think it is a
concerted class strategy to retake urban centers and that holds not just
for residential but recreational stuff, restaurants- the very same restaurant we all love marketplaces and transportation. It has become virtually global. Model of gentrification in London- actually there is
more gcntri fication in London than New York City, it is very extraordinary the e arc becoming the model for Shanghai.
d : Do you believe thi i being exported, and is not just a process of
maximizing capital.
N : I had never thought about referring to it as the export of gentrification, but it make sen c. It i certainly a proces where the folks in Mexico City or hanghai arc looking at what i happening in New York or
Tokyo or Vancouver and aying, "Hey, we can do that here, why not. We
have a lot of crappy hou ing and poor people live in right next to the
urban center and why don't we just move them out and build Vancouver-style housing." I think that i the level on wh ich it happens. Again it
all ha to do with city-to-city competition. Thirty year ago, almost no
cities in the world had office de igncd to attract funding and investment. They had tourism offices, but not industrial invc tments. Now
every city, even citic of 50 000 people, will have an office designed to
send group of bu incss people, academics and government people to
Taipei to get people to invc t money in building , in race hor es in univcrsi tic , in cu ltura l facilitic , in factories, in anything that produces
jobs. That i uch an extraordinary side of interurban competition.
omcbody hould go back and look at the figure , of how these cities
developed office of"moncy grubbing" a I like to call them.
dC: Shifting sca les for a moment, where do you see the ' region' and
where do you sec the role of the ' region ' in the latest round of globalizati on?
N : That's a wonderful quc tion bccau c I think the tate of the region
is fairly unclear. One thing l ' m clear about i that it, to quote the title of
a book, " It is not a regional world we live in anymore." The idea of it
disclosure 13
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being a regional world is in part a leftover of a certain sort of American
conservative nostalgia for the old regional geograph ies and it gets
replayed through a certain kind of contemporary economic geography,
an economic geography that is influenced even by Marx 's work. The
argument I'd want to make is that focu ing on regions i particularly
American, because America was the largest economy and it could ustain its regions longer than anyone else. Gia gow, cotland, i a city that
was de-industrializing in J 918 and nobody cared. It didn ' t matter until
suddenly in the 1970s America discovered dcindus trialL~ation. Part of
the reason we didn 't discover it until the 1970s is because most of industrial England and the US didn't de-industrial izc unti I the post-war
period.
Deindustrialization has been a long-term process. The destruction
and the disintegration of the region has been a long-term process.
Instead of regions being the production platforms this is the politics or
steel relations- instead of the region being the production platform for
the nation (which was reasonable until the I 970's), what we arc now
looking at is urban economies as the production platform for the globa l
economy. In saying that it's urban, I'm still saying there arc connections
that take place. So it's not just Bangkok; it's who is upplying Bangkok
with electronic goods, textile goods, automotive goods. Of course, these
suppliers are often the much smaller villages in its hinterland. It's not
just the city but it's the metropolitan arena that is crucial, and that i
what I mean by urban production platforms. We've got to be much
sharper in scale politics and its urban focus even though that incorporates rural production units.
Now that's a very important part of the story, but it's not the whole
story. If you shift to an empirical focus, certainly in the United States, in
Latin America, in Australia you are seeing the di sintegration of these
regional complexes very much as part of the dcindustrialization process.
In Europe it's different. It's different for very particular reasons. Ycs,
there is a disintegration of the old economic industrial regions, whether
central Scotland or Lancashire or Yorkshire or the Rhine region . But
there is also something else going on.
There is a politically-based attempt to reconstruct regional identities in Europe at the behest of the European Union. So what is that
about? It is not a response to economic change, so much as it's a
response to political change. The EU is reconstructing a regionalized
world in Europe in order to combat nationali sm. They arc trying to man130
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age regional identity by constructing a European identity rather than
fragmented national identities. That's the argument. The regional identity is being con tructed to offset older nationalisms and they are doing a
very good job or it and they are throwing a lot of money at it. I can't
remember the exact figures now, but something like 60% of the European Union's budget i aimed at constructing these regional/economic/
cultural/political identitie . That is not divorced from economic issues
either, bccau c of cour e tourism is one of central ways in which these
idcntitic get con tructcd.
d : I low docs the introduction of the Euro play into that?
N : I'm from Britain, and I can't believe the sma ll-minded idiocy of the

British Labour Party in not joining the Euro. The Euro is a smart political move. The uro i de igned to compete with US capital· it's
designed to create a market and a currency regime that will be big
enough to take on the United State . That give the European Union a
problem: on the one hand [they are] trying to unify Europe in a denationalized kind or way through the currency and on the other hand they
arc pu hing for narrow regional identities, but what gets missed in that
whole equation is the national cale. So you ec the shift that has taken
place. There i the international that i being empha ized, the Euro, and
there is the uh-national in which they emphasize the regions.
The re ult or thi i that there is much more of a pro-European feeling in Scotland and in Wales and of cour c in Ireland, which of course
i n'ta part or Britain and the northern part shouldn't be a part of Britain.
These have alway been much more co mopolitan places. In something
like 1899 there wa a uppo ed headline in the London Times that read
"Fog in Channel, ontincnt I olated" and that is exactly the feeling in
England al large, c pccially southern England today.
dC: While on the ubjcct of insularity what needs to be done to change
the culture of the academy? ln one of your articles you noted that for
tenure in the US what i cmpha ized are national conferences and
national journal . I low do we begin to build inter-di ciplinary and international linkages? What do we need to do to change the culture of the
academy?
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NS: I'm very sympathetic to the argument that you have to fi ght for
socialist politics wherever you are. For most of us that means the academy. I think that also is used as an excuse for people not to fight in other
places, so I want to be clear about that. We have to be politically
involved outside the academy. If you are not, it really hampers you. You
get blinders. Having said that, I'm fairly involved with the International
Critical Geography (ICG) group, which is a group that ha managed to
have three conferences si nce 1997 where between 25 and 40 countries
are represented. One was in Vancouver, one was in out h Korea, and the
most recent was in Hungary. That is very deliberate, to not meet in
places like New York or London or Tokyo. So that i very important,
because in a weird way, spent disciplinary organizations like the A soc iation of American Geographers (AAG) are ju t not understanding the
internationalization of academic work that is going on. The AAG manages to get away with it because now the AAG is the biggest conference
for British geographers, even bigger than the Institute of British Geographers conferences. The AAG is a fundamentally national conference. A
much as they like international people to come because they pay more
money to attend the conference, especially if they aren' t members the
focus is still rigorously American.
I think the ICG group has real advantages actua lly. It's just natural :
our group is younger, more intell ectually savvy, and it's certainl y politically much more progressive. [It's a place] where sociali sts and feminists can come together and talk and not have a lot of that normal
academic bullshit on the agenda and have good debates abou t political
stuff. I think the ICG is a great antidote to much of academia and I think
it is something we should build. I think the nex t confe rence is go ing to
be in Mexico in 2005.
Actually the AAG recently floated the idea of changing its name to
the Association of the Advancement of Geography, to recogni ze the
international context and drop the American. The last news I saw suggested people really weren't go ing to go for it it is just clumsy. It's an
attempt to evo lve into something different without making any real
change. What's the problem with real change? You want to change the
name of the organization, let's change it to the Internati onal Critica l
Geography group. Actually, I don ' t recommend that, there arc a lot of
people in the AAG who wouldn ' t want that. What's the problem with
real change, why do you have to try lo fudge those issues without having the debates? I think the main problem in the AAG is that there still is

N : First, let me just say about Graciela, he was an extraord inary person. She lived through the coup in Chile, which many people don't
realize, happened September 11th, 1973. And had he still been alive in
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no real place to have those political debates in the discipline as a whole.

dC: That' totally right. Thinking back to after September 11th, some of
the high ranking AAG officials were touting within the organizational
newsletter how the war on terror and its surveillance element would provide great opportunities for geography as a discipline, without any discussion about whether this is the type of discipline geography wants to
be.
: These arc the same people who are pissed off at us because we are
.. politicizing" geography omchow that we arc getting political. On the
other hand, they very clearly took their ide with George Bush, or the
democratic friend of George Bush, believing in the war on terrorismwhich i a dra tic ideological misnomer- and saying, "Well O.K.,
what' in it for geographers?" The level of both political conservatism
and utter and total opportunism that was involved in that whole NSF
effort to advance an agenda on the geography of terrorism was extraordinary. H's not only that, I mean they claim to speak for the whole discipline. Well, many of us spoke out after September 11th in different
kinds of venue , about terror, terrorism and New York City and none of
what a large part of what the di cipline did was represented in this AAG
attempt to ta lk about the uni ftcd front of geographer to the geography
of terrorism. And so 1 think it i very clear there is a backlash in the
AAG. There is a re-conservatizing of the discipline that is palpable. We
arc going to have to ce what happens as a result of that. But what I
think it means is that many of u , who in previous periods felt some sort
of connection to the AAG, now feel it less so. And I think the question
of whether we want to be member of that organization is up for grabs.

dC: In your interview with geographer/activist Gracia Gabriela Ortega
you asked her "You are a political geographer and at the same time you
believe geography has a political purpose a political function in social
activism. 1low do you see the connection between political geography
and geography in politics?" And because it is a good question, we
would like to ask you your own question.
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September 1 lth 2001, she would have been very sure that all of us as
geographers understood the parallel ism.
I guess for me it's a biographical thing geography has always
been political. When I first came to the United States in the 1970s, I wa
fascinated by the ways in which geographical processes which often
meant physical processes- shaped the landscape. 1 love and till love
glacial geomorphology. I am just amazed at how glacier make landscapes. So what's political about that? Well, we li ve in those land capes
on a daily basis. And the way that phy ical processes create landscapes,
forcing turns in the road and leaving certain resources in some place
and not others, which in turn forces choices and debates about location,
is just intrinsically fascinating to me. So one cou ld say, the politics of
geography goes back to the physical geography for me.
Coming to the United States, and actua lly Philadelphia in particular, I saw the same kinds of extraordinary spatial differentiations I knew
about in physical landscape, but in the social landscape. So the area
around where I was living, around Chestnut Street, was largely white,
middle class, largely students at the University of Pennsylvania· but if
you went 120 yards north to Market Street, it was largely black, worki ng
class, high levels of unemployment, bars. The way that socia l di ffercntiation got written into the landscape was just stunning. As a young
undergraduate, I had , on the one hand, this sort of mi Id anarchi st ecological kind of politics in the early 1970s; on the other hand I was just fascinated by the geographical differentiation of the landscapes I would
walk around. What the year I spent in Philadelphia and the recognition
of the social differentiation of landscapes did was to allow me to put the
two together. So for me, politics is always in geography, I ca n't understand a geography that is not inherently politica l.
So when somebody says they want to be objective about their geography, I say I don ' t even understand what that means. Objective is not
the same as telling the truth . You tell the truth , whether you arc objective or not is a whole other thing. It is impossible to be objective. In the
18th century, to be 'objective' meant to have an objective, to have a
goal, in what you were doing. Now objective means precisely not to
have a goal. And it is a very di shonest use of the word "objective. "
The important point is that where things arc located has a lot to do
with who gets what and how. And it has a lot to do with power. So J
can't understand a geography that is not political. And I think one of the
challenges we have in the United States is to rcspatializc the politics.
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That is where the anti-globalization movement is quite good. Globalization is a spatial concept. And anti-globalization is about how we organize the space of the world.
dC: Currently, there is a heated debate in New York City about what is
to be done with the World Trade Center site. You have written extensively about September 11 and how the U.S government and media
were able to perform a shift in scale and nationalize an event that initially resonated strongly on both local and global sca les. Whatever
come to be built on that site will olidify, indeed spatialize, a form of
scalar politics. If you were somehow to become involved in the redevelopment of the World Trade enter itc, what would you like to see
done? I there a way thi land cape could be used to present a different
vcr ion of sca lar politic ?
N : The question is about the World Trade Center site and what happen . I am involved in the discussion, but not involved with the process.
Thi i an extraordinarily corporate process. I can tell you what I think is
going to happen and what I would like to happen. What I think is going
to happen is we arc going to get some version of a corporate reconstruction with some modulated memorial space. What it looks like I don't
think anyone knows yet. There arc two propo al on the books, but both
of them involve very high buildings and o one of the discussions is who
wi II work on the 80th noor of one of those buildings on that site. That is
a genuine quc tion. Even more importantly, who is going to lease the
space in one of tho c itcs? But actually even more importantly than
that, do you know what the in urance rate are going to look like for the
80th floor? I think that on omc level, the architect have not begun to
think about the level of political control and de ign control and geographical control the insurance industry will have. There will be a eries
of fight about that.
On September I I th, when the plane hit the buildings, it was an
extraordinary tragedy, it wa a globa l tragedy, but it was made into a
national tragedy. lt was made into "America Under Attack" which was
the leader on CNN, and that wa the headline in the New York Times the
next day, and that has been the motif ever incc. The nationalization of
that event, the "Attack on America," ha everything to do with ju tifying the war that have followed incc.
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But let's turn it around. If the event was nationalized then, what'
wrong with nationalizing the response now? If the nationalization of
response for war was appropriate, why don't we nationalize the site?
And nationalize the response to what was built. Why not make it where
the federal government is involved in the site? Better than that, why not
nationalize it in a way that the people involved who are relations of the
victims of the attack are centrally involved in determining the architecture? George Bush himself said there were ninety-one countries represented among the people who were killed in the building. o let's
internationalize the site, let's internationalize the kind of response, the
kind of memorial that should be put up and the kind of infrastructure
that is put in after this point. That's no more far-fetched than nationalizing the event on CNN; in fact, it's just a reciprocal political wager.
But also, what shou ldn ' t get lost arc the very local impacts as well.
Places like Chinatown were hammered by that event and they have
received virtually no support since. Businesses have closed, not so much
because of proximity to the site, but because of the tourism that failed
after September 11th. And even tourism that is now happening because
of the site has not offset the losses to Chinatown.
The money that sloshed into New York in bucket loads or at least
electronic bucket loads for twenty years, from the late 70s into the
21st century, came from all over the world. The refinancing of New
York was all about Lower Manhattan and the outer boroughs paid for it.
The transportation links are worse than they were 30 years ago, and the
smashing of the Trade Center has actually accentuated that. The li ves of
the people in the outer bureaus are more separate from the lives of the
people in Manhattan than they were 20 years ago. And all the benefits of
the global city and Manhattan were concentrated there. It seems to me a
democratization, an internationalization of the response, would also
include rebuilding parts of the inner-suburbs, because these arc the
places that paid for the wealth of Manhattan in the 1980s and the 1990s.
Hunter Thompson just came out with a new book that sa id if you
look back at the last part of the 20th century it's go ing to look like a
party for rich boys compared to what we are about to face in the 2 1st
century. And f think he is abso lutely right and that plays out geographically. The party for rich boys, and some rich girls as well , was happening in the 1980s and the 1990s in Manhattan but it also was built on
poverty that dominates some of the areas of the outer boroughs, areas
which now because of the poverty and disinvestment in housing are the
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subject and target of gentrification. When you say a vicious cycle, it's a
very vicious cycle for the people who pay the price. I think the rebuilding should pay attention to both those urban scale issues and internationalizations.
I would want international representation for those ninety one
countries. There is a precedent for it. The level of grief, of relations and
friends and lovers is so significant, to me that trumps private property
relationships. Sorry, but nothing seems sacred in the private market, and
that level of grief and the force of human loss trumps the capitalist market and for that reason the process must be opened up.
d : Already, you have talked a little about the anti-globalization movement. You , along with many on the left, were optimistic about the possibilities for collective resistance following the "Battle in Seattle."
!low has the post- cptcmber I Ith climate affected the momentum of
that movement?
N : Well , you guys arc in a good of a position to judge that as me.
The anti-globalization movement made a disastrous mistake two weeks
after September I I th, when they decided to cancel their march on Washington. The March on Wa hington was going to be huge and it should
have become an anti-war march. If this was a war on terrori m- which
it is not it is a war for the endgame of globalization toe tablish a
multi-national, but American centered, global power over the economy.
And in that context, an anti-war movement is an anti-globalization
movement. And vicc-vcr a. And that should be obvious to them and it
wa obvious to some people. A march did take place, there were about
25,000 people who went to Washington, and that was good. But I think
the movement tumbled entirely, but luckily I think it got itself back on
track. In fact, ju t the other night I wa talking to someone who thought
the anti-globalization movement ought to get rid of the anti-war movement and become an anti-globalization movement again. And that is
exactly not what I would expect to happen. But that's the extent to
which the anti-globalization movement ha become the anti-war movement. And that' exactly right. You can't fight globalization without
fighting against an American war that pretend to be on the one hand for
the global good, and on the other hand, i really about particular elite
capi talist interests.
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I'm optimistic because, going back to those moments of U.S. global
ambition, yeah, we are not in a situation where Eugene V. Debbs as a
Socialist gets a million votes, we don ' t have that anymore. We are not in
a position, where in 1919 strikes break out all over the place after the
war and there is this working class political so lidarity to demand
change. On the other hand , looking back to more recent history, looking
back to the origins of the Vietnam War, as anyone who wa around in
the early l 960's will tell you, there is much more opposition to the war
in Iraq, which is almost certainly coming, and even to the war in
Afghanistan, than there was to the Vietnam war. o, I am optimistic for
that reason.
But I am optimistic, because I was out of the country for a few
weeks in December and January, and the difference between the media
when I left and when 1 came back was palpable. It took me a coup le
days to figure it out, but there is more opposition now appearing in the
media. People are now getting mildly serious and ober about the fact
that (a) this almost certainly will not be a short war and (b) it is going to
cause thousands of Iraqis as well as many American to be killed. People are sobering up to what that means and thinking "do we actua lly
want to do this and why?" The majority of the British population, in all
polls, has been against the war, even pol ls that arc slanted toward a certain editorial style. r think if you asked a decent, fair question to the
American popu lation, J think most Americans would not want thi war
either. Certainly if you asked, "Do you want your sons and daughters to
go off and get ki lled in this war?"' they would say no. And if you let
them know this is what is going to happen to a significant number of
people, the American people would be against the war.
dC: The nationalistic fervor is waning as we separate ourselves from the
attack.
NS: Yes, September I I th was an amazing gift to thi s small group of
neo-cons. It provided them with rationale to do things they on ly could
have dreamt of doing before, and ki ll ing Sadaam I lusscin is on ly one
part of that. The level of global revenge they wi ll now pursue could
never have been thought of without September I I th . It sounds perverse,
but the source of the tragedy lies with the people who arc cynically
using September I I th, not with those of us who arc against the war; it is
those in the Bush administration who arc crying crocodile tears whi le
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executing vicious political agendas that they never would have been
able to get away with before.
dC: I low much docs the news media play into your world view? You
cite everything from the New York Times to the Sydney Morning Herald to the Washington Post in your work. So it is obvious to us you are
not u ing academia as your crutch for information.

: If you did a carch of academic articles looking at how often these
newspapers were cited, I bet you could go back twenty-five years and
never find a single one that cited the news media. Now, at least in geography, we cite the news media tremendously. There is a good and a bad
side to that. The good side is that it's a sign that the discipline is getting
back in touch with the world and I think that is a great thing. That is why
New York Times citations pis off conservatives, because New York
Times article arc not '"old enough" yet to be true- to be real history.
And they arc not entirely wrong: they do have a point, because the news
media i kind of the first draft of history. But the good side is you are
getting current event . Geography should be the kind of place where
you can talk about omconc like Giuliani· you should be able to talk
about how a mayor who has become particularly revanchist is changing
the social geography of the city. It should be up for grabs to use the
new media, because nothing cl e i written on it.
On the other hand, there is a tendency to cite the news media and
think it is true. Of cour e the media is riddled with lies, untruths and partial truth . And you have to be very careful about that. And I think the
same is uc come up with web citation . I fundamentally don't trust
account that arc purely wcb-ba ed, and maybe that is the old fart in me,
but there ha to be ome ort of evidential balance. There i stuff in the
media you can't get in book ta hed away in a du ty library shelf but
then again you need those book to give you a sort of critical vision on
the New York Time article . But in general, I cc the increased use of
media sources a a po itivc thing.
dC: So how important is it to peak out in the media and go out and give
public lecture ?

N : It is tremendously important, but it i hard to do, bccau c acce s i
blocked to a lot of place . I get blocked. We get interviewed a lot for
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things, but the question is who is interv iewing you and under what conditions. I get interviewed a lot on questions of gentrification and questions of geography as a discipline and on global issues, but it's who is
doing the interviewing. Right now, fo reign sources are much more interested in what I have to say than local sources. For examp le, the New
York Times ran a series of three articles on gentri ficat ion of Harlem, and
I have written extensively about that, and they did n't interview me.
They will interview a rea ltor and a couple of academ ic who have done
no work on gentrification in Harlem but have a broad ly pro-gentrification type approach and who can hardly spell ll arlem. o there is this
extraordinary censorship; it is really a crapshoot. It really takes some
reporter getting a hold of you, liking what you say, and continuing to
come back to you. Their radar screen is very conservati ve, so those of us
doing critical geography or marxist work or femi nist work or politica l
work are not in the obvious pl aces reporters arc going to call up.
Though I have to say, there was a wonderful piece about the graduate
center at CUNY and the expansion of the geographic pre cnce at the
center. It is all about contacts and the fi lter, whi ch is utterl y political.
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dC: Any concluding comments or notes of optimism.
NS: Rock the world. No, it's a littl e facetious to end on that. Actually,
geography is fantastic place to be academicall y, and for all the critiques
of the AAG and the establishment, compared with how it was for much
of the 20th century, it has changed more than any other discipline since
the 1960's, because of academic uneven development. Jt was moribund
in the 1960's and now Terry Eagleton is right, it is the sex iest discipline
in a lot of ways, precisely because no one can look at you and say "that
is not geography." When people say that to me now, it is always someone outside the di scipline, never someone inside the discipline. Geographers know better than that. For all the necessary critiques, it is
incredibly open.

Notes
1. The Bush administration has repealed the tariffs on foreign steel since
the interview was conducted.
2. Webber's book introduces the concept of the "non-place urban
realm."
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Globalization in 25 Words or Less

The Worldwide expan ion and increa ed integration of international
markets, globa l capital, economics trade liberalization foreign policie , social Ii fe between nation , and growth of globa l awareness.
Rachel Gray
Un iversity of Kentucky
Uni ted States
Globali zation... the movement of people, cul ture, and technologies
aero space.
Zhang Jiajie
National Univcr ity of Singapore
Singapore

disC/osure 13

141

